

A BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD.

v.

PAWAN KUMAR GUPTA

(Civil Appeal No. 1085 of 2008)

B

SEPTEMBER 16, 2015

[V. GOPALA GOWDA AND AMITAVA ROY, JJ.]

C *Limitation Act, Art. 112 – Applicability of – DoT entitled to file suit within thirty years under the period of limitation provided u/Art. 112 – Assets and liabilities transferred by DoT (of Central Government) to appellant-company – Suit filed by appellant-company beyond the period of 3 years against the respondent-subscriber for the amount due from the*
D *installation of telephone connection – Whether benefit of Art.112 accrue in favour of appellant-company – Held: Appellant Company is a statutory authority, it is not synonymous with the Central Government – It is distinctly independent and separate entity – Not entitled to benefit u/*
E *Article 112 – General Clauses Act, 1897 – s.3(8) – Transfer of Property Act – s.3.*

Words and phrases: Expression ‘Central Government’ – Meaning of.

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Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: The assets and liabilities are transferred by the erstwhile DoT in favour of the appellant-company, including the debts due from the subscribers, the
G **respondents, an asset which is registered with the company pursuant to the transfer of assets and liabilities as provided under Section 130 of the TP Act. Undisputedly the suit claims against the debtors/**
H **subscribers are beyond the period of three years of**

limitation which is available. Therefore, contention that the benefit accrued in favour of the Central Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act is attracted to the fact situation, has a far reaching consequences for the reason that, though the Company is a statutory authority, it is not synonymous with the Central Government. The expression 'Central Government' under the General Clauses Act is clearly defined. By a reading of the definition, the appellant-company which is registered under the Companies Act, though having share capital of the company owned in the name of the President is 100% cannot be construed as the Central Government. It is for the reason that the appellant-company by registration under the Companies Act, no doubt is under the control of the Central Government as it is financed and its administration is under the absolute control of the Central Government, nonetheless, the appellant-company is a separate legal entity. It also cannot claim that it is entitled to the benefit under Article 112 of the Limitation Act on the ground that a debt recoverable from the subscriber is an actionable claim in terms of Section 3 of the TP Act, even if the same has been transferred under Section 130 of the TP Act by execution of the Office Memorandum, thereby vesting in it the rights and the remedies *vis-a-vis* the same. No doubt, by execution of the said instrument, it has got the actionable claim transferred, the assets that must be recoverable debts from the debtors and subscribers. By virtue of Article 112, a suit can be instituted by or on behalf of the Central Government. It is not the case of the appellant that it has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government. This is for the reason that the appellant-company has instituted the suit on the basis of the instrument of Office Memorandum wherein the DoT has transferred its assets

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A and actionable claims. The appellant is a company, a distinctly independent and separate entity. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the Article 112 of the Limitation Act to claim that there would be thirty years of limitation period as the asset transferred is an actionable claim due to the DoT is wholly misconceived in law. Article 112 of the Limitation Act speaks of the Central Government or the State Government. Its agencies or instrumentalities are not incorporated under Article 112 of the Limitation Act. Therefore argument on behalf of the appellant-company that it is an agency or instrumentality under the Central Government which falls within the inclusive definition as defined under Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act is wholly misconceived. [Para 9 and 10] [410-E-F, H; 411-A-G; 412- D-H; 413-A]

D *Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. vs. State of T. N. and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533: 2002 (2) SCR 383; A.K. Bindal and Anr. vs. U.O.I. & Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 163: 2003 (3) SCR 928; Food Corporation of India vs. Municipal Committee, Jalalabad & Anr. (1999) 6 SCC 74 – referred to.*

Case Law Reference

F	2002 (2) SCR 383	referred to.	Para 10
	2003 (3) SCR 928	referred to.	Para 11
	(1999) 6 SCC 74	referred to.	Para 11

G CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1085 of 2008

H From the Judgment and Order dated 12.07.2007 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 835 of 2007

BHARAT SANCHAR NIGAM LTD. v. PAWAN KUMAR
GUPTA

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With

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C.A. No. 3420 of 2012

C.A. No. 2409 of 2009

R. D. Agrawala, Pawan Kumar, Maneesha Dhir, Gagan
Gupta, Abhishek Kumar, K. Vijay Kumar for the Appellant.

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Upamanyu Hazarika, Dharitry Phookan, Paul Roy P.,
Tatini Basu, Suyodhan B., G. Ramakrishna Prasad for the
Respondent.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.

Civil Appeal Nos. 1085/2008 and 2409/2009:

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1. Since the issue involved in both the appeals is
common and facts are identical, we dispose of both the
appeals by this common judgment.

2. Heard Mr. R.D. Agrawala, learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellant in both the appeals and Ms. Tatini
Basu, learned counsel for the respondent in Civil Appeal No.
2409/2009. *Despite service of notice on the sole-respondent
in Civil Appeal No. 1085/2008, he remained unrepresented.*

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3. For the sake of convenience, the facts are taken from
the leading case i.e. Civil Appeal No. 1085/2008. This appeal
arises out of the judgment and order dated 12.07.2007 passed
by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana dismissing Regular
Second Appeal No. 835/2007 by affirming the judgment and
decree dated 2.09.2006 passed by the learned District Judge,
Bhiwani in dismissing the original suit filed by the appellant
herein against the respondent on the ground that the suit claim
is barred by limitation. The correctness of the same is
questioned in this appeal(s), urging various grounds.

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A 4. Mr. R.D. Agrawala, learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellant, inter alia contends that the appellant being a
Central Government Undertaking, a Company, which is an
instrumentality of the State, has got vested rights on the
B execution of the instrument, Office Memorandum dated
30.09.2000 wherein the Department of Telecommunication
(hereinafter referred to as the "DoT"), of the Central
Government represented by its Secretary has executed the
said Office Memorandum by transferring the assets and
C liabilities in respect of the business currently being carried out
on account of the Government to the appellant-company on
the book value thereof. The book value of the assets comprising
of the business transferred in favour of the appellant-company
has been provisionally assessed at Rs. 63,000/- Crores.
D Therefore, learned senior counsel for the appellant submits
that it is an actionable claim as defined under Section 3 of the
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the
"TP Act") which means a claim to any debt which is an asset
under Section 130 of the TP Act. The said actionable claim,
E according to the learned senior counsel, has been transferred
in favour of the appellant-company by the execution of
instrument i.e. Office Memorandum, referred to supra,
therefore, all the rights and remedies of the transferor-DoT vests
with the transferee-company. Hence, the appellant-company
F is entitled to recover or enforce such debts or actionable claim
against the respondent-subscriber.

5. Learned senior counsel for the appellant has further
placed reliance upon the book, titled "Accounting Standards
and Corporate Accounting Practices" by Dr. T.P. Ghosh in
G support of the contention that the current assets include assets
(such as inventories and trade receivables). He placed strong
reliance upon the meaning of the word 'vested' from the
Webster's Dictionary in support of his contention and submits
H that by virtue of the execution of the aforesaid Office

Memorandum, the transfer of all the rights and remedies in relation to the actionable claim, which is a debt legally recoverable from the subscribers, are vested with the appellant-company, and therefore, the benefit of Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963 of instituting a suit within thirty years from the date of the cause of action is available for the appellant-company or in the alternative three years from the date of incorporation of the company. He also placed strong reliance upon Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which defines 'Central Government' as under:

"3(8). 'Central Government' shall,-

(a) in relation to anything done before the commencement of the Constitution, mean the Governor General or the Governor General in Council, as the case may be; and shall include,-

(i) in relation to functions entrusted under sub-section (1) of Section 124 of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the Government of a Province, the Provincial Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that sub-section; and

(ii) in relation to the administration of a Chief Commissioner's Province, the Chief Commissioner acting within the scope of the authority given to him under sub-section (3) of section 94 of the said Act; and

(b) in relation to anything done or to be done after the commencement of the Constitution, mean the President; and shall include,-

(i) in relation to functions entrusted under clause (1) of article 258 of the Constitution, to the

A Government of a State, the State Government acting within the scope of the authority given to it under that clause;

B (ii) in relation to the administration of a Part C State (before the commencement of the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, the Chief Commissioner or the Lieutenant - Governor or the Government of a neighbouring State or other authority acting within the scope of the authority given to him or it under article 239 or article 243 of the Constitution, as the case may be; and

C (iii) in relation to the administration of a Union territory, the administrator thereof acting within the scope of the authority given to him under article 239 of the Constitution.”

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6. Further, the learned senior counsel by placing strong reliance upon the definition of the ‘Central Government’, which is an inclusive definition, submits that the Central Government also includes such authorities as are indicated therein. Since the appellant-company is incorporated under the Companies Act and it has acquired the assets and liabilities of the DoT, as an instrumentality of the Central Government, the appellant being a company having a separate and distinct entity from the Central Government, its functioning is controlled by the Central Government and, therefore, it is entitled to avail the benefit under Section 112 of the Limitation Act. Alternatively, it is contended by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the suit claim is not barred by limitation if its cause of action arose for the appellant-company either on 30.09.2000 i.e. the date of execution of the Office Memorandum transferring the assets and liabilities or on 01.10.2010, the date of its incorporation, as the case may be. Taking either of the said dates into consideration, the suit claim is within three years

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and maintainable and, therefore, the courts below were not right in dismissing the suit claim made in the original suit proceedings before the various courts, which is contrary to law. He, therefore, requested this Court to set aside the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the trial court and affirmed by the High Court in the second appeal/civil revision petition.

7. The query that falls for our scrutiny in that, though, in respect of the claim against the respondent-subscriber, the amount due from the installation of the telephone connection i.e. 29.01.1992 till its disconnection on 16.03.1998 is Rs.25,296/-, the DoT of the Central Government is entitled to file a suit within thirty years under the period of limitation provided under Article 112 of the Limitation Act, whether this benefit will accrue in favour of the appellant-company either from the date of the execution of the Office Memorandum, referred to supra, transferring the assets and liabilities and remedies, or the date of its incorporation. This aspect of the matter is examined by us very carefully in the light of the provisions of Section 3 and Section 130 of the TP Act and in the backdrop of the Office Memorandum vis-a-vis the Office Memorandum dated 30.09.2000 executed in favour of the appellant-company transferring its assets and liabilities and also remedies available for the transferor in favour of the appellant-company, the legal contention urged is that by virtue of the said transfer an actionable claim, i.e. a claim to any debt from the subscriber should be recoverable debt from the subscriber by the company. Reliance is placed upon the Accounting Standards and Corporate Accounting, referred to supra, and the clarification given in the said extracts, to contend that the actionable claim/ current assets includes the inventories and trade receivables and the said principle is applicable to the appellant-company, being a registered company under the provisions of the Companies Act. Section 133 of the

- A Companies Act, 2013 which provides that the Central Government would prescribe accounting standards and Section 3(8) of the General Clauses Act, which relevant provision is extracted hereinabove, have been relied upon to substantiate the contention that the appellant-company is an
- B agency or instrumentality of the Central Government as it is being financed and controlled by the Central Government, and therefore, the benefit accrued in favour of the DoT of the Central Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act would stand extended to the appellant-company, it being an instrumentality
- C of the Central Government for the reason that 100% share capital of the company is owned in the name of the President of India, and therefore, it partakes the character of Central Government. It is urged that this aspect of the matter has not been properly examined and considered by the courts below
- D while rendering the impugned judgments and decrees.

8. These contentions cannot be accepted by this Court for the following reasons:

- E 9. No doubt, the assets and liabilities are transferred by the erstwhile DoT in favour of the appellant-company, including the debts due from the subscribers, the respondents herein, an asset which is registered with the company pursuant to the transfer of assets and liabilities as provided under Section
- F 130 of the TP Act upon which reliance is placed by the learned senior counsel. What requires to be carefully examined is that the actionable claim, a claim to any debt from a subscriber-debtor after the assets and liabilities are transferred by an instrument, the Office Memorandum, referred to supra, in favour
- G of the appellant-company, is a legally recoverable debt to avail the remedy which is transferred in favour of the appellant-company. It could be seen from the undisputed facts, which are adverted to in the impugned judgment that undisputedly
- H the suit claims against the debtors/subscribers are beyond

the period of three years of limitation which is available. A
Therefore, contention of the learned senior counsel on behalf
of the appellant-company that the benefit accrued in favour of
the Central Government under Article 112 of the Limitation Act
is attracted to the fact situation, has a far reaching
consequences for the reason that, though the Company is a B
statutory authority, it is not synonymous with the Central
Government. The expression 'Central Government' under the
General Clauses Act is clearly defined, which relevant provision
is extracted in the aforestated portion of this judgment. By a C
reading of the aforestated definition, at no stretch of
imagination it can be construed that the appellant-company
which is registered under the Companies Act, though share
capital of the company owned in the name of the President is
100 per cent, it cannot be construed as the Central Government D
for the reason that the appellant-company by registration under
the Companies Act, no doubt it is under the control of the Central
Government as it is financed and its administration is under
the absolute control of the Central Government, nonetheless,
it shall not be construed as the Central Government for the E
reason that the appellant-company is a separate legal entity. It
also cannot claim that it is entitled to the benefit under Article
112 of the Limitation Act on the ground that a debt recoverable
from the subscriber is an actionable claim in terms of Section
3 of the TP Act, even if the same has been transferred under F
Section 130 of the TP Act by execution of the Office
Memorandum, referred to supra, thereby vesting in it the rights
and the remedies vis-a-vis the same. No doubt, by execution
of the said instrument it has got the actionable claim
transferred, the assets that must be recoverable debts from G
the debtors and subscribers. As could be seen from the claim,
the undisputed facts of these appeals are that on the date of
the transfer, some of the claims were time barred, therefore,
the company cannot construe that the time barred debts are

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A also an actionable claim by way of transfer in its favour, which entitles it to avail the benefit of Section 112 of the Limitation Act i.e. the period of thirty years to institute suits for recovery of the same. Such an interpretation is contrary to Article 112 of the Limitation Act, 1963. A careful reading of Article 112 of the
B Limitation Act clearly reveals that in any suit (except a suit before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction) by or on behalf of the Central Government or any State Government, including the Government of the State of
C Jammu and Kashmir, the period of limitation would be thirty years. The period of limitation time from which the period begins to run is mentioned under Column 3 of the above Article of the Limitation in the Schedule, which reads as follows. "When the period of limitation would begin to run under this Act against
D a like suit by a private person."

10. By a careful reading of the aforesaid Article, it makes abundantly clear, that a suit can be instituted by or on behalf of the Central Government. It is not the case of the appellant herein that it has filed the suit on behalf of the Central Government.
E This is for the reason that the appellant-company has instituted the suit on the basis of the instrument of Office Memorandum wherein the DoT has transferred its assets and actionable claims. It cannot be said that it has filed the suit on behalf of
F the Central Government because the appellant/plaintiff is a company, a distinctly independent and separate entity. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the aforesaid Article 112 of the Limitation Act to claim that there would be thirty years of limitation period as the asset transferred is an actionable claim
G due to the DoT is wholly misconceived in law. The other argument advanced by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant-company that it is an agency or instrumentality under the Central Government which falls within the inclusive definition as defined under Section 3(8) of the General Clauses
H Act is wholly misconceived for the reason that Article 112 of

the Limitation Act speaks of the Central Government or the State Government. Its agencies or instrumentalities are not incorporated under Article 112 of the Limitation Act. Such an argument is contrary to the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) and Ors. vs. State of T.N. and Ors. reported in (2002) 3 SCC 533. In paragraph 14 of the said judgment it is categorically stated that the legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process and the Court cannot do the legislative functions. Para 14 of the said judgment reads thus:

“14. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd., (2000) 5 SCC 515. The legislative casus omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as was done in Narasimhaiah’s case, (1996) 3 SCC 88. In Nanjudaiah’s case, (1996) 10 SCC 619, the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of High Court’s order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clauses (i) and/or (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent.”

(Emphasis supplied by this Court)

A 11. In the connected matter i.e. Civil Appeal No. 2409/
2009, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has
placed reliance on two judgments of this Court in the cases of
B A.K. Bindal & Anr. vs. U.O.I. & Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 163 paras
5, 14 and 17 and Food Corporation of India vs. Municipal
C Committee, Jalalabad & Anr., (1999) 6 SCC 74, in support of
the contention that the expressions 'Central Government' or
'State Government' in terms of Section 3(8) and Section 3(60)
of the General Clauses Act do not include in their purview or
definition their agencies or instrumentalities.

D 12. In view of the aforesaid judgments of this Court, the
legal contention urged by the learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant that the appellant being the agency
or instrumentality of the Central Government is entitled to
E maintain the suit claims within thirty years as provided under
Article 112 of the Schedule in the Limitation Act or alternatively,
whatever the limitation period which was available for the
Central Government, within three years from the date of
execution of the agreement are wholly unsustainable in law.

F 13. For the foregoing reasons, in the instant cases, even
a question of law does not arise, not to speak of a substantial
question of law. The appeals must fail. Accordingly, the appeals
are dismissed. No costs.

G 14. Since the appellant had deposited a sum of Rs.
25,000/- in terms of this Court's Order dated 28.01.2008
towards the costs of litigation of respondent, as he remained
absent despite service of notice upon him, the appellant is
permitted to withdraw the said money along with interest, if
any.

Civil Appeal No. 3420/2012:

H [B.S.N.L. & Anr. vs. Tata Communications Ltd.:

15. This statutory appeal is arising out of the judgment and order dated 16.11.2011 passed by the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal', Petition No. 423 of 2010 filed by the respondent, wherein it has sought for setting aside of the demand notices dated 28.10.2010 and 12.11.2010 relating to a demand of Rs.1,36,74,762/- containing an amount of Rs.1,29,89,326/, Rs.3,11,950/- and Rs.3,73,486/- of the Appellant No.1 herein, which was allowed by the Tribunal by adverting to certain relevant clauses of the interconnect agreement between the parties.

16. While setting aside the impugned demand notices, the Tribunal inter alia held as under:

"26. In view our finding in Petition No.186 of 2010, the respondent cannot raise the demand for a period more than 3 years as per the Limitation Act. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the demand raised prior to period October 2007 will not be admissible. Further, in view of the rival contentions about the different bills after October 2007, there is a need for reconciliation of account between the petitioner and the respondent for the period November 2007 to October 2009. If any amount is outstanding, the petitioner will be liable to pay the same amount to the respondent and vice versa. Both the parties are directed to reconcile the amount within four weeks."

17. It is clear from the aforesaid order of the Tribunal that it had already answered the issues in Petition No. 186 of 2010 wherein it held that the appellant cannot raise the demand for a period of more than three years as per the Limitation Act. Therefore, it opined that the demand raised by the appellant

A company prior to period October, 2007 will not be admissible. Further, the Tribunal having said so, has further stated, keeping in view the rival contentions about the different bills after October, 2007, that there is a need for reconciliation of account between the parties for the period November, 2007 to October, 2009. It has further ordered that, if any amount is outstanding, the respondent would be liable to pay the same amount to the appellant herein and vice-versa and both the parties were directed to reconcile the account within four weeks. It has also awarded interest at the rate of 12% per month from the date of deposit of Rs.60,00,000/-, which amount was deposited pursuant to interim order dated 16.12.2010 passed by the Tribunal thereby staying the disconnection of electricity to the respondent. It was made clear, that the said direction of deposit was subject to payment of interest. Therefore, by clarificatory order on the same day, the Tribunal has stated that till the outcome of the measure of reconciliation, as directed in the impugned judgment and order by the parties, the amount would carry with it interest at the rate of 12% per month from the date of deposit till the date of refund by the appellant Company. The correctness of the said judgment is questioned by the appellant Company by filing an appeal under Section 18 of the TRAI Act. Section 18 of the TRAI Act provides a statutory appeal against the judgment and order of the appellate tribunal to this Court on one or more grounds specified in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'CPC'). That means, that the statutory appeal under Section 18 of the TRAI Act would lie only on a substantial question of law. According to the appellant-Company, it has framed a number of questions of law which are, according to the learned counsel, substantial questions of law. The same are reproduced hereinbelow:

H "a) Whether the Appellant being an instrumentality of the Central Government was entitled to the protection of Article 112 of the Limitation Act and

thus the claim of the Appellant was covered by the limitation period of 30 years?

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b) Whether the Ld. TDSAT erred in holding that in view of its findings in Petition No.186 of 2010, the Appellant cannot raise the demand for a period more than three years as per the Limitation Act and that the demand raised prior to October 2007 will not be admissible?

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c) Whether the grant of interest by Ld. TDSAT from the date of decree was by way of a clerical or arithmetical mistake which could be corrected in exercise of its power under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

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d) Whether the Ld. TDSAT can grant interest to the Respondent who has not filed either review or an application seeking grant of interest in the main judgment?

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e) Whether the notices dated 28.10.2010 and 12.11.2010 were in the nature of fresh demands or mere reminders to make good the short payments from July 2005 to October 2009 especially in view of the fact that the bills issued during the said period were never disputed by the Respondent?

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f) Whether the stand taken by the Respondent that all billing issues for the period between July 2005 to October 2009 have been settled and closed since there was no claim/dispute raised by the Appellant is contrary to the various documents on record?"

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18. In our considered view, the questions a, d, e and f framed by the appellant Company in the Memorandum of

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A its statutory appeal having regard to the undisputed fact that
the Tribunal has recorded the finding of fact on the basis of the
relevant clauses of the interconnect agreement between the
parties and also with reference to the legal contentions urged
on behalf of the appellant that it, being an instrumentality of the
B Central Government, is entitled to the protection under Article
112 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, it was covered by the
limitation period of 30 years. The said contention is not tenable
in law for the reasons already enumerated in the earlier part of
this judgment.

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19. Therefore, the finding of fact recorded rejecting the
aforesaid contention by the Tribunal is perfectly legal and valid.
The same cannot be re-agitated by the appellant Company by
framing the substantial questions of law namely a, d, e and f.
D The said finding is based on proper interpretation of undisputed
facts and the relevant clauses of the interconnect agreement
and relevant clauses of the Schedule in the Limitation Act.
Insofar as the substantial questions framed at b & c in the
memorandum of appeal filed are concerned, they also cannot
E be termed as substantial question of law as it is a question of
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal particularly having
regard to the undisputed fact that the Tribunal on the same
day of pronouncement of judgment, has awarded interest on
the amount of Rs.60,00,000/- payable after the reconciliation
F of the account that is required to be done by the parties. The
said amount was deposited by virtue of an interim order granted
by the Tribunal not to disconnect the connection of the
respondent, as the disconnection notice issued by the appellant
G Company was stayed by the Tribunal and such direction was
subject to payment of interest etc. on the amount of deposit
repayable by the appellant Company after reconciliation and
adjustment of the amount legally due to the respondent. That
means, the claim of the appellant is not within the period of
H limitation and therefore, the same do not constitute and cannot

be termed as substantial questions of law for consideration of this Court and answer thereof. A

20. For the reasons stated supra, there is no substantial questions of law, which would arise for consideration of this Court and the appeal must fail, which we order. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. B

21. Since we have dismissed the appeal, the question of passing an order on the other application to give direction on the application does not arise in these proceedings. If the appellant is required to pay any amount due to the respondent it is open for the respondent to pursue the same in the manner known to law. With this liberty I.A. No.2 is also disposed of. C

Devika Gujral

Appeal dismissed. D